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The investigators studied foreclosure and loss data from loan records and
financial reports, comparing the experience of public and private agencies.
They also examined the operations of the federal and sponsored credit
agencies to determine if they had been self-supporting. Naturally, the
variety of the programs makes it difficult to generalize about the credit
experience of the government; but a few facts stand out.
First, the government had an exceptionally favorable record in refinanc-
ing debts that were in default in the darkest days of the early thirties. The
home mortgage refunding operations of the Home Owners' Loan Corpo-
ration and the farm mortgages held by the Land Bank Commissioner,
which represented really severe risks, a notable record of repay-
ment. The explanation offered by the authors is that borrowers under
these depression programs were only temporarily embarrassed, and .eco-
nomic recovery put them back on their feet.
Second, the federal government has had an unfavorable credit experi-
ence when it attempted to supply credit, sometimes during depression but
even during periods of general economic prosperity, to business firms and
farm enterprises unable —becauseof their newness, or owing to some
weakness in financing position or management —tofind financing on
reasonable terms through private lenders.
Third, it became clear that the cooperative financial institutions spon-
sored by the government fared well as lenders, becoming more and more
like private institutions as time passed and registering a credit experience
broadly comparable to private lenders.
A fourth point evidenced by the study is the close relationship between
the loss experience o.f a federal credit agency and the type of credit func-
tion it performs. For example, nearly two-thirds of RFC's business loans
extinguished with loss were made to newly established firms. Also, losses
were significantly higher where credit information about the borrowers
was inadequate.
Finally, the investigators noticed the similarity between the lending
experiences of public and private agencies when the two operate under
comparable circumstances. To illustrate, HOLC foreclosed nearly 20 per
cent of the more than 1 million mortgages which they refinanced. And the
major/life insurance companies foreclosed nearly 21 per cent of the home
mortgages which they had made in the period 1925 to 1929: The same
regional differences applied to both also, foreclosures being more numer-
ous in the Northeast and Middle Atlantic states, and more frequent on
properties located in highly industrialized and heavily populated areas.
25Lending experience in agriculture varied under the different types of
programs, but was generally not unfavorable, compared well with
private lenders.
The recordof the Federal Land Banks has been good, andin fact some-
what better than that of private farm mortgage lending institutions. During
the thirties, of' course, 'delinquencies and losses rose sharply. By 1933,
about half of the loans were delinquent or had been extended to prevent
default. Foreclosures averaged nearly 10,000 a year in the decade
1930—40. Since then, there have been virtually no delinquencies or fore-
closures, and losses have been negligible.
Most of the Land Bank Commissioner lOans were made at the very
bottom of the depression. This was an emergency program; yet experience
with the loans was far more favorable than expected, apparently because
of their long-term and liberal amortization characteristics, extending' over
a long period of recovery. By the end of 1940, losses on the Commissioner
loans were 0.42 per cent of cumulative outstanding loan balances, com-
pared to 0.51 per cent for the Land Banks. •'
Inthe case of production credit to agriculture, loss experience is about
the same as that of commercial banks, though it varies widely frOth' region
to region and from time to time. Over the twenty-year history of the
production credit associations,' net losses and provision for losses have
amounted to only 0.14 per cent of total cash advanced. Similarly favorable
records were built up by the Banks for Cooperatives. Total net losses from
the time of organization of these banks through 1953 were 0.07 per, cent
of total loans made, or 0.1,3 per cent of cumulative outstanding loan.,
balances.
The heaviest losses in the agricultural field have come in those pro-
grams of the Farmers Home Administration and its predecessors in which
credit was extended for general farmoperating and production or emer-
gency and disaster purposes, either on the, security of farm real estate or
on relatively short term. These credit. programs.were specifically designed.
to assist low-income farmers, farm tenants, or farm laborers who
not obtain financing from private sources at conventional rates of interest.
It was thus expected that losses would be, substantial —and.so they have
been. To mid-1953 the loss rate on loans for' general farm. operating and
production purposes —coveringrural rehabilitation, production and sub-
sistence, and water facilities programs —was:4.4 per cent of the total
amount advanced, and the combined loss rate for loans of the emergency
type, such as the disaster loan and emergency crop and feed loan programs,
was in excess of 10 per cent.
However, loss experience 'in the Farmers Home Administration's real
26estate credit programs was not unduly. severe, and in fact compared well
with the Land Bank or the Land Bank Commissioner loans.
Because of improved general economic conditions since the beginning
of their operations, credit experience of federal agencies lending to busi-
ness has been much better than would otherwise have been the case,
though less favorable than that of commercial lenders. It is estimated that
the RFC, from 1934 through 1951, suffered a loss of about 2 cents on
every dollar lent to businesses. Federal Reserve Bank loans showed a
somewhat smaller loss, though high by conventional standards. Losses by
the. Maritime Administration and the Export-Import Bank have been
negligible. Maritime, of course, extends and renews loans freely. To June
30, 1954, losses of the Export-Import Bank were 0.01 per cent of credit
advanced.
:
Inhousing, the experience, was more favorable on loans secured. by
small, medium-priced owner-occupied homes than on loans secured by
income-producing structures such as apartment houses. Through 1953,
the• Federal National Mortgage Association, an agency empowered to
purchase VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured loans, terminated less than
1 per cent of home loans by foreclosure; but at the same date, fully 10 per
cent of FHA-insured housing project loans had been foreclosed. The
low, risk associated with financing small owner-occupied houses is illus-
trated also by the exceedingly favorable loan insurance and guarantee
history of the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans' Adminis-
tration. From 1934 to 1953, FHA paid claims equal to only 2 per cent
of the net proceeds of loans insured for modernization and improvement
—andrecoveries amounted to 40.9 per cent of claims paid. On home
mortgage loans insured by FHA, foreclosures represented about 0.5 per
cent of the original amount of the loans. Under the VA home mortgage
guarantee program, claim payments through 1953 were made on only
0.6 per cent of the loans.
Have Federal Credit Programs Been Self-Supporting?
Difficult as analyses of costs and revenues of federal credit agencies proved
to be, the investigators examined each program and arrived at approxi-
mate answers. Most'of the agencies lending to agriculture have managed
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